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IN DEFENSE OF THE BUSINESS CULTURAL
VALUES REFLECTED IN THE ITALIAN
SECURITIES MARKETS: WHAT THE U.S. 2008
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN CAN TEACH US
Maria DiMeo Calvelli
INTRODUCTION
The argument for corporate governance reform in the Italian capital
markets has been driven predominantly by the dual goals of encouraging
companies to seek financing from these markets and creating a more
attractive Italian equity market for both domestic and international
investors. The movement has been driven by the need to: (1) increase
investor confidence in the Italian capital markets by providing investors
with greater protections against risks of expropriation of company value;
(2) implement European Community (EC) directives and regulations; (3)
react to corporate scandals; and (4) model the corporate governance
methodologies of other developed countries such as the United States.1
In contrast to the United States, in Italy there are few listed companies
that are widely held. The typical Italian listed company is instead governed
by dominant individual or family shareholders who, without owning a large
percentage of the company’s cash flow rights, exercise control over a
majority of the company’s votes. Often, the controlling shareholder
exercises voting control without owning a large fraction of the cash flow
rights flowing from ownership.2 In such a company, the minority
shareholders’ security holdings reflect predominantly a right to the flow of
company profits. The valuation of the initial investment in the company

Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College
(CUNY), J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988. Research for this article was supported by funding
from PSC-CUNY. An earlier version of this article was presented as part of the Zicklin School of
Business, Department of Law 2010 Faculty Scholarship Series and I thank all participants for their
valuable feedback. Nicole E. Wise (J.D. candidate, 2011, Fordham Law School) provided
excellent research assistance. I also want to extend particular thanks to Professor Sandra Mullings
for her guidance and very helpful suggestions and to the leadership of the National Italian
American Foundation for its valuable input and assistance. All errors are my own.
1. Luca Enriques, Modernizing Italy’s Corporate Governance Institutions: Mission
Accomplished? 3, 41–42 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 123/2009, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400999. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic Consequences]; Jonathan R.
Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American’s Perspective, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
121.
2. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 486 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Corporate
Ownership] (discussing how Fiat’s pyramidal ownership structure results in one person or family
controlling 20% of the voting rights but only 15.47% of the cash flow rights).
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(purchase price) is presumably derived from the limited contractual rights
of the security acquired. Interestingly, the difference between the value of
voting and non-voting shares of Italian corporations has been found to be
one of the highest in the world.3 Such a price differential demonstrates the
ability of the market to distinguish between the rights flowing from the
purchase of one type of company security and another security of the same
company.
Much has been written about the different consequences for corporate
governance resulting from different ownership structures.4 The literature
has focused predominantly on the need to reform governance systems to
increase the protection afforded to minority shareholders.5 Reforms are
meant to address the imbalance between: (1) the cash flow rights available
to minority shareholders and voting rights controlled by dominant
entrenched shareholders; and (2) the cash flow rights and limited voting

3. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 568 Table 6 (2004); Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate
Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2007); Tatiana Nenova, The
Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325,
327–28, 331–36, 340–41 (2003); Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the
Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125, 125–26 (1994), available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/luigi.zingales/research/papers/votingright1994.pdf
[hereinafter
Zingales, Value of the Voting Right].
4. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 2. Note that recent work by
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani has pointed out the need for a separate methodology to
assess the level of corporate governance protection provided to outside investors in both
controlling shareholder companies and non-controlling shareholder companies, and has further
identified key features that these separate methodologies should include. According to Bebchuk
and Hamdani,
any attempt to assess the governance of public firms around the world should depend
critically on ownership structure. Some arrangements that benefit outside investors in
companies without a controlling shareholder are either practically irrelevant or even
counterproductive in the presence of a controlling shareholder, and vice versa.
Because of this fundamental difference between companies with and without a
controlling shareholder, any governance-rating methodology that applies a single metric
to companies or countries worldwide is bound to produce an inaccurate or even
distorted picture.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1316 (2009).
5. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 1113 (1998); Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity
Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2002). See also Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth,
8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 24 (1999) (discussing how economic growth is supported by the
existence of legal systems that protect the outside shareholders); Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance,
52 J. FIN. 1131, 1139 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants] (surveying 49
countries and finding that smaller and narrower capital markets are associated with countries with
lower levels of investor protection).
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power available to minority shareholders and day-to-day control exercised
by entrenched management.6 Hence, the goals of reforms in general have
been to hold managers accountable to minority shareholders and to prevent
or limit the exposure of minority investors to the opportunism of the inside
dominant or controlling shareholders.
Since at least 1998, Italy has begun the actual process of reforming its
corporate governance. Much of this work has been in alignment with the
corporate governance standards of the U.S. The Draghi Law, for example,
resulted in changes to the process used for capital markets offerings as well
as takeovers, to the disclosure obligations of corporations, to the
functioning of audit firms, and to minority shareholder rights, all in ways
intended to mirror the U.S. and U.K. approach to corporate governance.7
These developments appear to be aimed at improving buyer comfort with
respect to investing in securities listed on the Italian capital markets.
There is no doubt that Italian corporate governance has improved
significantly since the passage of the Draghi Law and subsequent reforms.8
And yet, there is a general sense that the Italian capital markets continue to
lag behind the capital markets of the U.S. and the U.K.9 As Italy has
improved its corporate governance, these benchmark countries have also
continued to move forward with corporate governance reforms. In addition,
the political, legal, and business cultures of common law countries continue
to be viewed as more favorable to the development of capital markets than
those of civil law countries such as Italy.10 Policymakers and academics,
therefore, continue to worry about the competitiveness of the Italian capital
markets and their ability to attract investors.
In assessing this competitiveness, much research has focused on the
need for additional reform, particularly in the area of increasing investor
rights with regard to the ability of controlling shareholders to divert to
themselves company value apart from the value of their share ownership.
6. Compare Zingales, Value of the Voting Right, supra note 3 (stressing that there are
economic benefits to control that corporate governance should address) with Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (stressing that the agency theory proposes that governance
mechanisms are necessary in order to align the interests of management with those of the owners).
7. See Enriques, supra note 1, at 13.
8. See generally id. (analyzing the effect of governance reforms and concluding that positive
changes have resulted from such reforms though there is still room for improvement).
9. Richard Cartey, EU Lags Behind US in Entrepreneurial Culture, EUOBSERVER.COM (Jan.
17, 2005, 5:27 PM), http://euobserver.com/?sid=9&aid=18157 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011)
(concluding that the main reason for the lack of entrepreneurial spirit in the EU is the difficulty in
finding financing); Leaders: Italy’s Unfinished Business, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2000, at 21
(discussing how the reform movement of the 1990s has been ineffective as economic growth in
Italy has been the slowest of all the European countries and blaming the lack of political will for
this ineffectiveness); The Real Sick Man of Europe; Italy, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 11
(discussing how Italy’s economy is stagnant and its corporate governance continues to suffer).
10. See generally Enriques, supra note 1; La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra
note 1.
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Many have been advocating reforms directed at neutralizing the power of
controlling shareholders.11 While Italy’s reform program since the 1990s
has focused on increasing the voice of minority shareholders in company
matters, improving internal controls, and expanding disclosure obligations,
its current challenge remains tackling the problem of the expropriation of
corporate benefits by controlling shareholders at the expense of the
minority. In response, in April 2008, the Commissione Nazionale Per Le
Societa e La Borsa (CONSOB)—the Italian version of the SEC—issued a
draft regulation (which it formally adopted in March 2010) addressing
related party transactions, the effect of which is to provide a check on the
power of controlling shareholders.12
In the United States, the current fundamental problem of corporate
governance is how to deal with the conflict of interest between dispersed
minority shareholders and powerful controlling managers. This problem,
which is a product of the separation of ownership and control,13 has resulted
in what many consider to be excessive managerial risk-taking, incentivized
by the structure of management compensation awards.14 Articles in the
mainstream media put at least part of the blame for the full market
meltdown occurring in the second half of 2008 on excessive risk-taking by
corporate executives.15 Pay for performance compensation packages
(equity-based compensation—most prominently in the form of awarding
stock options) have been criticized for incentivizing senior executives to
manipulate earnings and increase risk-taking in the name of short-term

11. See Enriques, supra note 1, at 8–9.
12. See CONSOB Resolution, 12 marzo 2010, n. 17221, in Gazz Uff. [G.U.] 25 marzo 2010,
n. 70 (It.), available in English at http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/laws/
reg17221e.htm.
13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–125 (1933). See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6.
14. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Tim
Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg163.htm
(stating that “compensation should be structured to account for the time horizon of risks”); Lucian
A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at
Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 261 (2010) (analyzing the
compensation of the top-five executive teams of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns during the
2000–2008 period and concluding that “given the structure of executives’ payoffs, the possibility
that risk-taking decisions were influenced by incentives should not be dismissed, but rather,
should be taken seriously”). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating
Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010) (suggesting there is wide recognition that pay
packages which focus excessively on short-term results produce incentives for excessive risktaking and stating “[e]xcessive risk-taking in the financial sector has played an important role in
the major financial crisis of 2008-09”).
15. E.g., Leo Hindery, Jr., Why We Need to Limit Executive Compensation, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/nov2008/
ca2008114_493532.htm (describing how excessive CEO pay is at the center of America’s
economic problems); Matt Townsend, Lehman, Bear Officials Made $2.5 Billion, Study Says
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Nov. 23, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aLS5o0JQrykE (executive pay may have encouraged risk-taking).
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gains so as to maximize payouts available from exercising their options.16
The result was a system-wide failure to manage and control risk and to use
risk management to inform management decision-making.
To date, the Italian reform process has been necessary and effective,
modeling the approach of common law countries such as the U.S. The 2008
financial crisis, however, clearly demonstrates that there continue to be
significant governance risks and issues associated even with the U.S.
approach. This Article argues that, while certain reforms relating to
controlling shareholders may still be necessary in order to improve the
attractiveness of the Italian market to investors, careful consideration should
be given to the potential positive aspects that derive from the existence of
controlling shareholders. It is time, therefore, to consider whether Italian
reforms should now focus on improving the business cultural advantages
inherent in the current Italian capital markets system, as opposed to moving
solely in the corporate governance direction of the U.S. and the U.K.
Part I provides background information on the business culture of Italy
with particular emphasis on the corporate structure of listed companies. Part
II is a summary of the corporate reforms implemented by Italy since the
early 1990s; the emphasis of which, in conformity with changes in U.S.
corporate governance laws, has been predominantly on improving minority
shareholder rights with respect to their companies.
Part III is a discussion of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, which occurred
despite the fact that the U.S. had earlier engaged in shareholder rights and
other corporate governance reforms and despite the fact that corporate
ownership in the U.S. is characterized by institutional shareholders who are
supposedly more inclined and more likely to monitor corporate decisionmaking. Part III explores the idea that at least part of the meltdown was the
result of uncontrolled managers who were incentivized by compensation
pay packages to focus on short-term gains instead of long-term company
goals. This Part further theorizes that this type of managerial expropriation
is at least as dangerous to shareholders as the issues that arise as a result of
the business culture of Italy.
Part IV explores the idea that the time has come for Italian reforms to
cease mirroring those of the U.S. and the U.K. Instead, Part IV argues that
Italy should look to the future and focus its reforms so as to maximize the
potential benefits that may flow from the existence of a controlling
shareholder, including the ability of a controlling shareholder to “manage”
management. Emphasis should be placed on this positive role and, moving
forward, regulatory reform should seek to balance the need for changes
which increase investor confidence and investor protections with the
potential positive role inherent in the existence of a controlling shareholder.
This Part further supports the existing cry for additional reforms to the
16. See infra Part III.
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Italian capital markets in the areas of greater transparency in the workings
of controlling shareholders and improvements in anti-fraud enforcement.
PART I: BUSINESS CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ITALY
Industrialization came late to Italy. By the end of the 1800s, Italy
lagged behind with an economy that was primarily agricultural. The first
phase of industrialization in Italy occurred from 1896 to 1914 when
universal banks, Banca Commerciale Italiana and Credito Italiano, provided
financing for entrepreneurial initiatives in the transportation (train engines
and automobiles) and mining industrial sectors. Even so, early on the Italian
government’s intervention was necessary to rescue certain of these
entrepreneurial companies. In 1911, for example, the Italian government
rescued the entire steel industry. Until 1990, when the state began to
actively divest itself of its corporate holdings, the Italian state actively
controlled the economy through its role as controlling shareholder of many
of the for-profit companies. State intervention in the economy continued to
expand through the creation of state agencies, such as the Instituto per la
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) in 1933 and later Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi
(ENI) in 1952, which managed the portfolio of companies controlled by the
banks. This continued intervention by the state replaced the role of private
financing and stifled the development of the Italian capital markets. Instead,
the state played an inordinately extensive role in capitalizing companies and
bailing out financially troubled companies. As the largest shareholder in the
capital-intensive sectors of the economy, the state placed little emphasis on,
and had little concern for, investor protection. In this environment of state
intervention and low investor protection, the economy was characterized by
state control in capital intensive industries and private family capitalism for
which the capital markets held no attraction.17
The economy of Italy began to change dramatically after the end of
World War II. From an agriculturally-based economy where large sectors
were controlled by the state, it has now developed into an industrial country
ranked in 2009 by the World Bank as the world’s seventh largest economy
based on GDP comparisons18 and the world’s tenth largest in terms of
purchasing power parity.19 Today, Italy’s economy derives in large part
from the processing and the manufacturing of quality consumer goods—
primarily in small and medium-sized family-owned firms—which typically
17. See generally Alexander Aganin & Paolo F. Volpin, The History of Corporate Ownership
in Italy, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FROM FAMILY
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 325 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (detailing a
complete historical review of the economic and regulatory policy of Italy and its role in limiting
the growth of Italian capital markets).
18. Gross Domestic Product 2009, WORLDBANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (last revised Dec. 15, 2010).
19. Gross Domestic Product 2009: PPP, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf (last revised Dec. 15, 2010).
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face significant international competition.20 Most Italian corporations
continue to be privately owned and privately controlled. There are few
listed companies in Italy, though this number has begun to increase in
recent years, and of the companies listed very few have shares that are
widely held.21 The economy and business culture of Italy seems to be
dominated by single-owner or family-owned firms.22
Those Italian companies which are listed are typically characterized by
the existence of a dominant or controlling shareholder—usually a family—
who controls voting power. One common model is where the controlling
shareholder exercises voting control without owning a significant fraction
of the cash flow rights.23 The separation of control from cash flow rights is
often accomplished in one of three ways: use of a pyramidal structure,24
cross-shareholding structures or dual share structures in which voting shares
are retained by the controlling or dominant shareholder,25 and restricted
voting (or non-voting) shares issued to outside investors.26 In 1995, 15% of
the twenty largest listed companies in Italy were controlled by an individual
(family control)27 and 20% of the twenty largest listed companies were

20. The World Factbook: Italy, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html#Econ (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
21. Compare Companies Admitted to Listing from January 1995 to January 2011, BORSA
ITALIANA, http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/ufficio-stampa/dati-storici/listing2011.en_pdf
(last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (listing 357 companies on the Borsa Italiana Exchange), with Press
Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Announces New Contract for Dick Grasso Through May 2007
(Aug. 27, 2003), http://www.nyse.com/press/1061982038732.html (indicating that between 1995
and May 2007 alone, 1,549 companies were added to the already 2,800 companies listed on the
NYSE). See also La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 2, at 492 tbl. II.
22. Macey, supra note 1, at 141–42.
23. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3, at 117–19.
24. “The separation of ownership from control” as affected by the use of the pyramidal
structure is demonstrated by “Telecom Italia, one of the world’s largest telecom companies.”
Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3, at 119. The ownership structure of Telecom Italia in 2005 was
pyramidal in nature with Marco Tronchetti Provera controlling 18% of the votes in Telecom Italia
while holding only 0.7% of the cash flow rights. Id. Tronchetti was by far the largest shareholder
of Telecom Italia and his controlling interest is owned through a series of subsidiary relationships
owned and controlled ultimately by the Tronchetti family through the GPI, Camfin, Pirelli, and
Olimpia companies. Id. at 119–21. Control by Tronchetti with respect to the voting power in
Telecom Italia is further reinforced through a voting “agreement with other large shareholders” of
the Pirelli subsidiary. Id. at 120. As a result, Tronchetti controls 46.1% of the votes in Pirelli (25%
directly held by Tronchetti’s holding company, Camfin, and an additional 21.1% as a result of the
voting syndicate), Pirelli controls 50.4% of the votes in Olimpia and Olimpia controls 18% of the
votes in Telecom Italia making Provera by far the largest shareholder of Telecom Italia. Id. at
120–21.
25. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids,
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating
Control from Cash Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 299–301 (Randall
K. Morck ed., 2000).
26. See id. at 297–301.
27. La Porta et. al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 2, at 492 tbl. II.
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controlled through at least one publicly traded company (pyramidal
control).28
This family or dominant shareholder control of a company is not
necessarily bad. In fact, research shows that, on average, a family controlled
company is better managed than one where shareholdings are widely
dispersed.29 Such control may more closely align shareholder interests with
those of management. A controlling shareholder, for example, commonly
has both the incentive to monitor management and the opportunity to do
so.30 This shareholder holds a significant enough number of shares to
empower him to participate in the running of the company through both
formal channels (such as by choosing management) and informal channels
(exerting influence). Since family or dominant shareholders are in a better
position to utilize resources to monitor managers and to influence the
decision-making of the firm so as to maximize share value, the existence of
such shareholders can help protect all shareholder interests from
management abuses. These benefits of control accrue, through the action of
the dominant shareholder, to all shareholders.31
On the other hand, controlling shareholders in pyramidal structures—
such as those found in Italy—both limit outside shareholders’ ability to
influence decision-making and pose the threat of expropriation of private
benefits, which favor the dominant shareholder at the expense of these
minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder may extract corporate
resources from the corporation which serves the shareholder’s own
exclusive benefit yet may have adversely effect the value of the minority’s
shares. These private benefits include management perks such as excessive
compensation to management owners, managerial deference, and selfdealing transactions—such as “tunneling”32 and the transfer of assets and
profits from a company to controlling shareholders—as well as social and

28. Id. at 499 tbl. IV.
29. See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm
Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301 (2003).
30. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006).
31. Silvia Rigamonti, Evolution of Ownership and Control in Italian IPO Firms 6–7 (Borsa
Italiana BItNotes Series, Paper No. 17, 2007), available at http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsa
italiana/statistiche/bitnotes/numeripubblicati4839/bitnotes17.en.htm.
32. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3, at 122.
A hypothetical example may help to clarify how tunneling works. In the
pyramidal group . . . , imagine what would happen if Marco Tronchetti Provera forced
Telecom Italia to buy inputs from Camfin at above market prices. This related-party
transaction neither creates nor destroys value, because the loss for Telecom Italia is
equal to the gain for Camfin. But Tronchetti Provera would be better off, because he
pockets 29.1 percent of Camfin’s gain and suffers only 0.7 percent of Telecom Italia’s
loss.
Id.
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political prestige.33 Where a controlling shareholder uses his control
position to extract or transfer corporate resources for his own private
benefit, value is diminished for minority shareholders. The dominant
shareholder may, for example, enter into related party transactions between
its various companies on terms advantageous to one company and
disadvantageous to the other.34 The difference in value that is transferred
from the minority shareholders to the dominant one may be referred to as
the private benefits of control.
Some have claimed that, as a result of the risk of expropriation which
arises with the existence of controlling shareholders, the attractiveness of
the Italian securities markets to investors has been significantly
diminished.35 Like that of all other capital markets, the challenge for the
Italian securities market has been to attract investors willing to purchase
stock in listed companies while also attracting or encouraging companies to
list shares. The ability to offer shares that enable a family or other
controlling shareholder to retain decision-making control may encourage
family-owned or dominant shareholder controlled businesses to consider
listing. Attracting new companies to list is a necessary component of any
securities market. Yet, the securities being offered must also attract
investors to buy.
The current Italian business culture, characterized by small and midsized family-owned businesses and pyramidal structures that threaten
minority shareholders through expropriation, has been viewed as
detrimental to the growth of the Italian securities markets.36 Yet, this
cultural environment of dominant shareholders also provides a management

33. See generally Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1161–62 (1985) (discussing amenity potential
such as prestige and political connections as an attractive private benefit); Simon Johnson, Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS
& PROC.) 22 (2000) (discussing the many methods of transferring company resources to a
controlling shareholder including one who also acts as top management).
34. See Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanex, & Shleifer, supra note 33.
35. See Macey, supra note 1, at 132, 140 (providing anecdotal evidence of the same); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 742 (1997) (“In
many countries today, the law protects investors better than it does in Russia, Korea or Italy.”);
Zingales, Value of the Voting Right, supra note 3 (providing empirical evidence that Italian
corporate governance did not sufficiently protect investors from expropriation of minority
shareholder value).
36. We know, for example, that countries with weaker investor protections have less
developed financial markets. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 5; accord Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J.
FIN. 1 (2006); cf. Disiano Preite, Investitori Istituzionali e Riforma Del Diritto Delle Società Per
Azioni, 1993 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 476 (supporting the conclusion that Italian companies
competing on a global basis for financing were at a disadvantage as a result of poor investor
protection mechanisms).
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monitoring benefit, the value of which has yet to be fully discussed and
evaluated.37
PART II: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN ITALY: A
STATUS UPDATE
Italy has been actively engaged in the process of reforming and
regulating its capital markets with the goal of increasing investor
confidence by increasing shareholder rights. The intention behind the actual
legislated reforms and the changes produced by this reform movement has
been to align Italy’s capital markets with that of the U.S., by mirroring U.S.
corporate governance standards.38 The goal of the reforms has been to
decrease the need for state intervention and ownership by producing more
vibrant capital markets that can meet the financing needs of Italian
companies. These vibrant capital markets would decrease the concentrated
ownership characterized by the Italian business environment, increase
investor confidence, and foster entrepreneurship.
The first step in this reform period began in the 1990s when the Italian
government began privatizing state-controlled companies by making shares
in such companies available to investors through private sales, IPOs, and,
for already listed companies that were state controlled, through the sale of
control blocks in the markets.39 This privatization was the first necessary
step in decreasing state intervention in companies and increasing dispersed
share ownership in these companies. Between 1991 and 1994, investment
services and stock exchange regulations were modernized, insider trading
was banned, and a new regulatory framework was created for takeover bids,
all laying the groundwork for further capital market development.40
37. See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 25 (emphasizing that although corporate
structures used for separating control from cash flow rights create significant limitations on the
rights of outside shareholders to influence decision-making and thereby increase agency cost, it is
necessary to ascertain whether any benefits inure to the outside shareholders as a result of these
structures that warrant the increased agency cost).
38. See generally Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3.
39. Decreto Legge [D.L.] 31 maggio 1994, n. 332, in Gazz. Uff. 1 giugno 1994, n. 474 (It.),
available at http://www.consob.it/main/documenti/Regolamentazione/normativa/leg474.htm?
hkeywords=&docid=2&page=0&hits=16; Legge [L.] 30 luglio 1994, n. 474, in Gazz. Uff. 30
luglio, n. 177 (It.), available at http://guide.supereva.it/diritto/interventi/2001/06/51599.shtml. See
also Marcello Bianchi & Luca Enriques, Corporate Governance in Italy after the 1998 Reform:
What Role for Institutional Investors? (CONSOB Quaderni Di Finanza: Studi e Ricerche, Paper
No. 43, 2001) (discussing the legislative reform movement in Italy), available at
http://www.consob.it/mainen/consob/publications/papers/papers.html?symblink=/mainen/consob/
publications/papers/index.html (follow the “Corporate Governance in Italy after the 1998 reform:
what role for institutional investors?” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). See generally
Enriques, supra note 1 (summarizing the laws and regulations relating to the reform of the Italian
capital markets and Italian corporate governance).
40. Leggi [L] 17 maggio 1991, n. 157, in Gazz. Uff. 20 maggio 1991, n. 116 (It.), available at
http://guide.supereva.it/diritto/interventi/2001/05/45043.shtml (banning the use of confidential
information for trading by insiders); Leggi [L] 18 febbraio 1992, n. 149 in Suppl. Ordinario Alla
Gazz. Uff. 21 febbraio 1992, n. 43 (It.), available at http://guide.supereva.it/diritto/interventi/
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Additionally, as an initial move to attract purchasers to these newly
privatized companies, 1994 decrees mandated the representation of
minority shareholders on the boards of directors of the privatized
companies by requiring that one-fifth of the board of director seats, as well
as one seat on internal auditor boards—the internal corporate body of
Italian corporations responsible for overseeing audit functions—be
allocated to these shareholders.41 The early 1990s, therefore, reflected a
growing recognition of the need to decrease state involvement by increasing
the attraction of the markets both to those already listed and now privatized
companies and to outside investors.
The main legislative reform in Italy began in 1998 with the passage of
corporate governance legislation in the form of the Draghi Law.42 The
Draghi Law was meant not only to apply—as the prior reforms
predominantly did—to those companies that were being privatized through
the disposition of state holdings to outside investors, but also to any listed
or newly listed company. New rights were granted to minority shareholders
in these companies and the exercise of existing rights was expanded.
Protections were fortified by the requirement that, at extraordinary
shareholder meetings, a vote of two-thirds of the capital represented at the
meeting was necessary for the approval of amendments to the corporate
charter, new issuances of shares, and mergers.43 Shareholders holding at
least 5% of the company’s capital were now further empowered to sue
directors derivatively (later amended in 2005 to holders of 2.5%);44
shareholders holding 5% or more of the company’s shares could now
request that a shareholder meeting be convened;45 and shareholders with
10% or more of the company’s shares may file a complaint with the court
asking for the appointment of an inspector to review the business of the
corporation.46
The Draghi Law also revised the role, composition, and powers of the
board of internal auditors. As in the case of the minority shareholders of
privatized companies, minority shareholders of listed companies are now

2001/05/43415.shtml (regulating the process for public offerings, subscriptions, purchases and
exchanges of securities and authorizing CONSOB to develop and implement regulations relating
to takeover bidding).
41. D.L. n. 332/1994 (It.), arts. 4, 5; L. n. 474/1994 (It.).
42. Decreto Legislativo [D.Lgs.] 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 (It.), available at
http://www.consob.it/main/regolamentazione/tuf/tuf.html?queryid=main.regolamentazione.tuf&re
sultmethod=tuf&search=1&amp;symblink=/main/regolamentazione/tuf/index.html; Codice Civile
[C.c.] arts. 2368, 2369, available at http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=37056.
43. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 126(4); C.c. arts. 2368, 2369 (It.).
44. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998, art. 129; Codice Civile [C.c]. art. 2393-bis (It.). See Legge [L.] 28
dicembre 2005, n. 262, in Suppl. Orginario Gazz. Uff. 28 dicembre 2005, n. 208 (It.) (reducing the
percentage required for derivative suits to 2.5%).
45. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 125; Codice Civile [C.c.] art. 2367 (It.).
46. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 128; Codice Civile [C.c.] art. 2409 (It.).
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also entitled to representation on the company’s internal auditor board.47
The responsibility of the internal auditors board to focus on controls was
also clarified.48 By strengthening minority shareholder rights,49 these
reforms also began limiting the ability of controlling shareholders to extract
private benefits.50
In conjunction with shareholder reforms, the Draghi Law also sought to
increase transparency by overhauling issuer disclosure obligations relating
to IPOs and material extraordinary transactions such as mergers, new
issuances, acquisitions and dispositions so as to align them more closely
with U.S. and U.K. disclosure requirements.51 For example, required
disclosure of ownership structure was expanded to include disclosure of all
existing shareholder agreements,52 a legal structure often used by Italian
companies to cement cross-shareholding relationships53 and thereby
increase dominant shareholder control. Disclosure of these agreements
began to provide markets with important information regarding the level of
entrenched control in a listed company.
Italy continued to revise its corporate law from 2001 through 2005
through the Vietti Reforms. These reforms required that shareholders of
listed companies be notified of their right to exercise shareholder voting
rights and the amount of shareholdings prior to shareholder meetings.54
Corporate charters may require that such communication (usually
electronic) be sent at most two days in advance of the meeting. Prior to this
reform, shareholders were required to deposit shares for five days before
shareholder meetings in order to be able to vote those shares. The reform no
longer requires such shareholder blocking, unless the charter expressly
forbids trading after the communication is sent. In this instance, trading
may be restricted for a maximum of the two day period between notification
and the shareholder meeting. If shares are sold prior to the meeting, voting
rights are reduced proportionately.55 As a result, participation by

47. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 148.
48. See id. art. 150, 151.
49. See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini, Corporate Governance Changes in the 20th Century: A View
from Italy 22–24 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 29, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=695762 (discussing how the impact of the Draghi Laws on Italian
corporate governance was an improvement on Italian shareholder protection, as calculated by the
La Porta corporate governance score, from 1 to 5). Accord Aganin & Volpin, supra note 17.
50. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 3, at 570 (empirically finding that before the passage of
the Draghi Law the average value of extracted private benefits in Italy was 47% and after the
reform the average had been reduced to 6%).
51. See generally Enriques, supra note 1; Enriques & Volpin, supra note 3.
52. D.Lgs. n. 58/1998 (It.), art. 122(1).
53. Enriques, supra note 1, at 10.
54. Codice Civile [C.c.] arts. 2366, 2370.
55. Id. art. 2370. For public companies, the share deposit requirement can no longer be
imposed for longer than two days in advance of the meeting. In addition, when shares are in
electronic form as in the case of listed companies, the deposit requirement is replaced by a
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institutional shareholders in shareholder meetings was made significantly
more attractive.56
Reforms inspired by the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act were introduced
from 2005 to 2008. The European Union’s Market Abuse Directive
strengthened sanctions for insider trading and securities fraud and granted
stronger investigative powers to public prosecutors and CONSOB.57 In
addition, during this time period: (1) minority shareholders were
empowered to add items on the shareholder meeting agenda as a result of a
reduction in the shareholding requirement from 5% to 2.5% of the capital
stock of the corporation;58 (2) shareholders holding a minimum of 2.5% of
the capital stock of the company could now initiate derivative actions
against the directors of the company;59 and (3) board representation for
minority shareholders was significantly improved by the requirement that at
least one director of the governing board in one-tier companies or one
supervisory board member in companies with two-tier boards must be
elected from a slate presented by the minority shareholders.60 Italy has also
imposed stricter disclosure obligations for listed companies relating to the
compensation of officers and directors based on the granting of stock or
securities.61 CONSOB has been afforded broader powers to ensure that
Italian listed companies comply with required disclosure obligations.62
Lastly, at the end of 2004, CONSOB was finally empowered to regulate
related third party transactions.
In April 2008, CONSOB proposed regulation to revise disclosure
obligations applying to related party transactions. On March 12, 2010,
Resolution No. 17221 passed new rules governing related party transactions
entered into by listed issuers.63 The regulation empowers independent
directors, organized in committees and possibly assisted by advisors, to
certification issued by the relevant intermediary attesting to the shareholder’s right to vote the
shares. See Enriques, supra note 1, at 28 n.80.
56. Enriques, supra note 1, at 28.
57. Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 (L 96/16) (EC); Commission Directive 2004/72, 2004 O.J.
(L 162/70) (EC).
58. Legge [L.] 28 dicembre 2005, n. 262, art. 5, in Suppl. Orginario Gazz. Uff. 28 dicembre
2005, n. 208 (It.).
59. Id. art 3; Decreto Legislativo [D.Lgs.] 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, art. 129 (It.), available at
http://www.consob.it/main/regolamentazione/tuf/tuf.html?queryid=main.regolamentazione.tuf&re
sultmethod=tuf&search=1&amp;symblink=/main/regolamentazione/tuf/index.html; C.c. art. 2393bis.
60. L. n. 262/2005, art. 1.
61. Id. art. 16. See also CONSOB Resolution 14 maggio 1999, n. 11971, art. 78, 84 (It.) (as
amended by CONSOB Resolution 3 maggio 2007, n. 15915 (It.); CONSOB Resolution 1 aprile
2009, n. 16859 (It.), available in English at http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/
laws/reg11971e.htm?mode=gfx#Article_78.
62. Decreto Legislativo [D.Lgs.] 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, arts. 91, 113–15 (It.), translated at
http://www.consob.it/main/regolamentazione/tuf/tuf.html?queryid=main.regolamentazione.tuf&re
sultmethod=tuf&search=1&amp;symblink=/main/regolamentazione/tuf/index.html.
63. CONSOB Resolution 12 marzo 2010, n. 17221, in Gazz Uff. 25 marzo 2010, n. 70 (It.),
available in English at http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/laws/reg17221e.htm.
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provide opinions on related party transactions ex ante. There are procedural
differences for material transactions64 and non-material transactions. In
connection with material transactions, independent directors are to be
specifically involved in the negotiation and preparation of the
documentation relating to the third party transaction. The opinion of the
independent director committee and any opinions of outside independent
advisers must be presented to the corporation’s administrative body as a
whole. The administrative body shall then take action to either approve or
disapprove the resolution authorizing the transaction. In addition, the
corporation’s administrative body may approve the material transaction
regardless of negative opinions of the independent board committee and/or
outside advisers if the transaction is approved by a favorable majority vote
of the unrelated shareholders (whitewash mechanism).65
The regulation further fosters transparency by enhancing existing
disclosure requirements. Issuers must publish a disclosure document within
seven days of the company’s approval of a material related party
transaction. The disclosure document must describe the transaction, the
economic rationale for the transaction that led the issuer to enter into the
transaction, and the method for determining the consideration paid for the
transaction. The requirement to disclose is also triggered if, during one
fiscal year, the issuer enters into multiple related party transactions with the
same related party that, when taken together, would amount to a material
transaction. In addition, the annual management report and the interim
management report must contain information on the specific material
transaction, on other related party transactions (including non-material
ones) entered into during the relevant time period and which significantly
affect the issuer’s assets or earnings, and any change or development in
related party transactions described in a previous annual financial report
that has a significant effect on the issuer’s assets or earnings.66
These reforms have translated into important developments for
corporate governance in Italy. First, the independence of boards of listed
companies has improved as a result of increased minority shareholder
representation on boards, the increased role of the audit board, and
strengthened procedures and board disclosure relating to self-dealing third
party transactions. Second, the power of minority shareholders has
increased through easier exercise of voting rights, the availability of
derivative suits for holders of at least 2.5% of total shares, and the lowering
of thresholds for the exercise of voting rights. Third, greater disclosure has
been mandated. Since at least 1998, therefore, Italy has reformed its capital
64. Id. at Annex 4. Material transactions are those where certain quantitative parameters
identified by the regulation, such as net assets, market capitalization, or total assets and liabilities,
exceeds a 5% threshold. Id. at Annex 3.
65. Id. art. 11, Annex 2.
66. Id.
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markets regulations so as to increase: (1) transparency with respect to
information available on listed companies; and (2) shareholder rights with
respect to corporate decision-making with the resulting expectation of
increased shareholder protection against the decisions and excesses of both
management and—with the passage of CONSOB’s 2010 regulation—
controlling or dominant shareholders. These important steps taken to
improve investor protection have increased the attractiveness of the Italian
capital markets to investors, including institutional investors.67 The recent
reforms directed at containing the possibility of dominant shareholder
expropriation should further positively impact the markets.68
PART III: THE 2008 U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: THERE IS NO
PERFECT SYSTEM
Since the Great Depression, America has not experienced a financial
crisis of such magnitude as that produced by the financial meltdown of
2008. In a single year, stock prices had plummeted further than at any other
time since the 1930s.69 This meltdown occurred despite the significant
improvements in U.S. corporate governance made over the past few
decades.
In contrast to the Italian capital markets improvements, which have
been focused on increasing the attraction of the market to investors, the
U.S. improvements have focused on defining the role of the corporation,
particularly as a body whose primary goal is to increase shareholder value.
In an environment where institutional share ownership increased, the U.S.
investor base changed from one comprised of passive individual
shareholders to one consisting of investors more engaged in corporate
affairs, more watchful of shareholder interests, and more focused on the
goal of increasing the value of their share of the company. Since the late

67. Enriques, supra note 1, at 35–36.
There is no doubt that the landscape is much friendlier to minority shareholders of
listed companies today than ten years ago . . . . Although it is of course impossible to
measure such improvements, one can go back to La Porta et al.’s indexes to see whether
Italy’s updated scores reflect a better corporate governance framework. Starting from
the original anti-director index, we can see how Italy’s score has steadily gone up, and
is now close to the highest possible.
Id.

68. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 453–54 (2008) (describing the
variables considered in determining the anti self-dealing index score); see also Enriques, supra
note 1, at 39 (concluding that although the Draghi Law had a modest positive impact on the index
which measures a country’s risk of shareholder expropriation of private benefits, the passage and
implementation of CONSOB Resolution 17221 will greatly improve this anti self-dealing score).
69. Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500 1–4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No.
124/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396126.

332

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

1970s, therefore, corporate governance has been the subject of significant
debate resulting from the incentive and agency problems associated with
management action in the corporation. With the separation of ownership
and management, shareholders—whose primary goal is the maximization of
the firm’s value—are forced to delegate the implementation of this goal to
effort- and risk-averse rational agents (managers) who are not necessarily
incentivized to take potentially growth producing risks on behalf of the
shareholders.70 In response to this agency problem, a number of best
practices were established in an attempt to align the interests of
shareholders with risk-averse management. These best practices include
board independence, separation of Chairman and CEO positions, and the
use of outcome-based compensation.
Unfortunately, with the revelation of such corporate scandals as Enron,
Worldcom, Tyco, Adelphia, and Global Crossing, the 2000s brought
increased attention to the need for management accountability. Prompt
legislative response arrived in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
which sought to restore investor confidence in the marketplace by
strengthening the existing corporate governance model with—once again—
heightened regulation. With the increase in share prices during the mid- to
late-2000s, it appeared that all was well again with the markets and
corporate governance.71 The meltdown of 2008 followed.
Many of the recently failed companies followed all the then-best
corporate governance practices. For instance, Lehman Brothers adopted
almost all of the suggested governance practices and even reserved a special
place on their website to explain that it had sound governance structures in
place, including compensation guidelines and a Code of Ethics. Why then
the financial crisis? Many causes have been suggested, including an
uncontrolled real estate market, the large amount of subprime lending in the
U.S., deregulation—in particular, deregulated derivatives—and oldfashioned greed. But underlying all these very specific reasons is a more
pervasive one—excessive and uncontrolled risk-taking.
Prior to the 2008 crisis, in most financial institutions, the majority of
executive compensation packages consisted of variable, performance-based
annual incentives delivered in both cash and equity.72 The use of these
70. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6; cf. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An
Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989) (discussing how agency theory is
concerned with two problems, one of which is the problem of risk-sharing that arises when
principals and agents have different attitudes toward risk).
71. See Cheffins, supra note 69, at 1. On October 9, 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
closed at the record level of 14,164.53. Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) History, N.Y.
STOCK & COMMODITY EXCHANGES, http://www.nyse.tv/dow-jones-industrial-average-historydjia.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
72. See Felix Suntheim, Managerial Compensation in the Financial Service Industry 8–9 (Sept.
29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592163 (discussing the
structure of CEO remuneration where based on an analysis of the CEO compensation packages of
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outcomes-based incentives—such as stock options and annual bonuses—as
a method of incentivizing management to perform in accordance with
shareholder desires, was believed to align the interests of managers with
shareholders by allowing managers to profit when shareholders profit. But
instead, the use of these compensation systems—in particular stock option
grants—as mechanisms for addressing the agency problem has encouraged
excessive risk-taking73 on the part of senior executives who, while
maximizing their personal payouts from option exercises, contributed to the
system-wide failure to manage and control risk that resulted in the 2008
financial crisis.74
A problem associated with stock options and other similar methods of
compensation is that, with these benefits, management is rewarded when
the stock price increases, but management’s real wealth is not penalized if
the stock price declines. Similarly, the use of annual bonus plans as a
management incentive causes executives to focus on single-year
performance and to incur risks that foster short-term benefits at the expense
of long-term planning.75 As a result, management compensation packages
have an aggressively risky impact on policy decision-making by executives.
By allowing management to recognize the value of equity-based and bonus
compensation before the long-term consequences of their decision-making
77 out of 100 of the largest international banks in 1997 finds that CEO pay in the banking industry
consists of four different components: base salary, short-term bonuses, stock options, and stock
ownership resulting from either the exercise of options and share plans, mandatory minimum
requirements on CEOs to own shares, or voluntary purchases made by the CEO).
73. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 29 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/Final
Report_web.pdf (acknowledging that compensation packages were a leading cause of the financial
crisis, particularly noting that “incentives for short-term gains overwhelmed the checks and
balances meant to mitigate against the risk of excess leverage”); see also Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen
D. Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (2006)
(studying the impact of executive compensation packages on risk and policy choices of U.S. banks
and finding that CEO incentives do have an impact on risk-taking); Robert DeYoung, Emma Y.
Peng & Meng Yan, Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial
Banks (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City Econ. Research Dep’t., Working Paper No. 10-02,
2010), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/RESWKPAP/PDF/rwp10-02.pdf
(reporting specifically that banks with a higher risk inducing compensation structure engage in
riskier polices).
74. See Suntheim, supra note 72, at 3–5 (empirically analyzing CEO compensation of major
international banks (including those of the U.K. and Italy) from 1997 to 2008 and concluding that
there is a “strong link between CEO incentives and bank risk taking,” that “banks from countries
with strong regulators rely more on equity based compensation than those from countries with
weaker shareholder protection” and that banks relying on CEO option based compensation and
short-term bonuses performed worse during the 2008 financial crisis than banks whose CEOs
were incentivized by holding a large share in stocks); cf. Cheffins, supra note 69, at 32 (“Hence,
while in a majority of companies removed from the S&P 500 in 2008 executive pay was
uncontroversial and the controversies that arose occurred in the ‘right’ companies, executive pay
likely deserves at least some of the blame for the 2008 stock market meltdown.”).
75. GERRY HANSELL ET AL., BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., FIXING WHAT’S WRONG WITH
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file
20211.pdf.
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become apparent, management is incentivized to focus on short-term results
and inadequately factor in the long-term risks associated with these
decisions.76 This form of managerial expropriation may be a reason why
companies like Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie
Mac got involved in risky ventures, such as mortgage securities, without
adequate concern for the long-term overall corporate risk.
The 2008 financial crisis provides important lessons regarding
incentives in the U.S. corporate system. First, the need for corporate risktaking associated with the motive of corporate gain must be balanced with
corporate risk-taking that is blind to long-term effects. Since both excessive
risk-taking and no risk-taking can have harmful corporate results, risk
management tools are needed to approximate optimal risk-taking behavior
on the part of management.77 Second, pay practices have outraged the
public as current systems do not appear to incentivize managers to perform
in the shareholders’ best interest. Setting pay strategies that incentivize
corporate risk-taking driven by short-term management gains without
consideration of long-term effects has had disastrous consequences.78 It is
evident that managerial expropriation has become a significant threat to the
well-being of individual corporations, to the U.S. and to the global financial
system as a whole.
This managerial expropriation is a significant problem for U.S. and
U.K. listed companies that are said to operate within an “outsider” system
of corporate governance79 in which the most important characteristic is

76. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 82, 87, 89 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay
Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 664–67, 669–670 (2005). Cf.
Suntheim, supra note 72.
77. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. 247 (2010) (discussing how bank executive pay has produced incentives for excessive risktaking and such pay should be reformed to achieve appropriate levels of corporate risk).
78. Though not the subject of this article, Congress has recently addressed the issue of
systemic risk-taking on a macro level by passing comprehensive regulations on July 15, 2010,
which, among other things, increased the tools available to financial regulators to identify and
curb reckless risk-taking. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The goal of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is to prevent future crises through the collection and analysis of
data concerning risk in the financial system by creating a Financial Stability Oversight Council
charged with looking beyond the safety of individual firms to the health and stability of the entire
system. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
Remarks on Passage of the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (July 15, 2010),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg777.aspx; Wall Street Reform,
FINANCIALSTABILITY.GOV, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Pages/wall-street-reform.aspx
(last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
79. Erik Berglöf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 159 (Klaus J. Hopt & E. Wymeersch eds., 1997);
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and Barriers to
Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY
26 (Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Ronneborg eds., 2002).
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widely-held share ownership. The principal challenge in such a system is
ensuring that management is accountable to—and its interests aligned
with—the interests of dispersed shareholders.80 Although dispersed
shareholder interests in the U.S. have been equated with higher stock
prices,81 the risk is that when charged with implementing corporate policy,
management will prefer its own short-term interests to the detriment of the
outside shareholders.
The main characteristic of Italian listed companies and the
corresponding corporate governance system, on the other hand, is that the
ownership of shares in these companies is predominantly concentrated in
the hands of dominant or controlling shareholders and shares are thus not
widely held. In this “insider” model, managers are accountable to the
controlling shareholders, as controlling shareholders are incentivized to
closely follow and monitor the actions of management.82
In contrast to managerial expropriation, the risk associated with insider
systems is that controlling shareholders will expropriate corporate assets to
their benefit and to the detriment of the minority shareholders (controlling
shareholder expropriation). As a result, the types of fraud that occur in
outsider versus insider systems are different. As evidenced by Enron and
Worldcom, the risk in the outside system is that management will focus on
short-term gains to obtain private benefits from executive compensation and
then hide poor corporate performance. On the other hand, as evidenced by
Parmalat, the risk in the inside system is that controlling shareholders
expropriate corporate funds or opportunities for their private benefit.83
Over the last several decades, regulatory reforms relating to the Italian
capital markets have focused on modeling U.S. and U.K. protections in an
attempt to move the “insider” model—a product of Italian business
culture—closer to the “outsider” model which exists in the U.S. and U.K.
The goal has been predominantly focused on more disperse share
ownership in conjunction with increasing protections for outside investors.
What the 2008 financial crisis has continued to demonstrate is that
managerial expropriation is at least as significant a problem for capital
markets as controlling shareholder expropriation. As a result, we should not
assume that there is one perfect capital markets system or that one risk
80. See John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery, After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and
Modernizing Securities Regulation in Europe and the US 8 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2006–07, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=910205 (discussing the
differences between outsider and insider systems); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 79, at 26
(discussing outsider systems).
81. Armour & McCahery, supra note 80, at 8.
82. Id.
83. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21
OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY 198 (2005) (discussing the differences between the Parmalat fraud
and the Enron fraud, and suggesting that the differences in these corporate scandals can be
explained by differences in the structure of share ownership).
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factor (managerial expropriation) is more or less manageable than another
(controlling shareholder expropriation). We should also not assume that the
legal reforms addressing the management risk in outsider systems are
appropriate—or required, or even sufficient—to address the expropriation
risk associated with insider systems.84 Recognizing that the outsider and
insider models create different risks for minority shareholders, certain
academics have even begun to advocate the development of separate
corporate governance indices for common law and civil law countries.85
These separate indices would address the different governance risks
associated with each of the “outsider” and “insider” systems separately and
identify different factors that make for good governance in each. Bebchuk
and Hamdani, for example, posit that rules facilitating voting by majority
shareholders by allowing for vote by mail or proxy or vote without the
deposit of shares are not critical in controlling shareholder companies,
while rules on disclosure and fiduciary duties governing self-dealing and
freezeouts matter more.86 Such distinctions will increase the usefulness of
indexes which attempt to assess corporate governance risk. This attempt to
develop a more comprehensive methodology for assessing shareholder
protections provided by countries with “outsider” and “insider” systems
implies an increasing awareness that the straightforward adoption of
common law protections by civil law countries such as Italy may not be the
solution, and indicates a growing recognition of the potential value in the
controlling shareholder model.
PART IV: ITALIAN CAPITAL MARKETS ADVANTAGE
The business culture of Italy which permeates its capital markets—
characterized mostly by controlling shareholder or family-owned
companies—suggests a different environment for the growth of these
markets. Empirical studies on the role of large shareholders have
demonstrated that family firms have lower agency costs and that these
lower costs are due to the fact that family members have positional
advantages in monitoring management and strong cash flow incentives to

84. Id.; see N. Balasubramanian, Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, Firm-Level
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Case Study of India 3 (Euro. Corp. Governance
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 119/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992529
(“[T]he benefits of particular corporate governance practices will vary depending on firm and
country characteristics.”); Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril
of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1808 (2008) (“The most effective
governance institution depends on context and on firms’ specific circumstances.”).
85. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 4, at 1268.
86. See Vikramaditya Khanna, Response, Corporate Governance Ratings: One Score, Two
Scores, or More?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 39, 43–44 (2009), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/10-2009/Khanna.pdf (explaining summarily Bebchuk and
Hamdani’s list of which governance practices matter most in outsider companies and which matter
most in insider companies).
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monitor firms closely.87 Family members have greater access to operational
and other firm information than other shareholders.88 The improved
monitoring of top management arises from the existence of the dominant
shareholder, a benefit that then accrues to all other shareholders.89 Research
has shown that the presence of a controlling shareholder may result in
improved corporate policing of management in public corporations and that
this policing function is more effective than the wide variety of market
techniques utilized when shareholdings are widely dispersed.90 The fact
that: (1) poorly performing managers are more likely to be eliminated in
Japanese firms with large shareholders as opposed to those without them;91
and (2) in Belgian firms, top management turnover increases with the
presence of dominant and family shareholders,92 indicates that there is a
direct connection between the replacement of management and the
existence of a dominant or controlling shareholder. These large
shareholders, therefore, can play an important role in monitoring
management and can directly benefit the outside minority shareholders by
the exercise of control over management.
Since the 1990s, the Italian capital markets have focused on the
adoption of reforms that better align Italy’s corporate governance with those
87. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, in MICHAEL
C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 175 (2nd prtg, 2001). See generally
Meckling & Jensen, supra note 6.
88. Benjamin Maury, Essays on the Costs and Benefits of Large Shareholders in Corporate
Governance 8 (Publ’n of the Swedish Sch. of Econ. & Bus. Admin., No. 127, 2004), available at
http://dhanken.shh.fi/dspace/bitstream/10227/99/2/127-951-555-830-1.pdf.
89. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94
J. POL. ECON. 461, 463 (1986) (analyzing the ways in which large shareholders increase corporate
value by bringing changes in corporate policy and stating that all shareholders benefit from these
changes since they too enjoy gains on the value of their shares).
90. Gilson, supra note 30; Maury, supra note 88, at 10.
91. See Jun-Koo Kang & Anil Shivdasani, Firm Performance, Corporate Governance and Top
Executive Turnover in Japan, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (1995). In this article, Kang and Shivdasani
examine the relationship between the non-routine replacement of top executives and firm
performance by analyzing information on 270 Japanese firms compiled from 1985 to 1990 in
order to assess the effects of main banks, block holders, kieretsu groups, and outside directors on
such relationship. Id. Main banks and other large shareholders were identified as having a major
role in the decision-making process regarding the appointment of new top executives from outside
the firm. Id. Their conclusion is that concentrated equity ownership has a significant effect on
Japanese corporate governance. Id.; cf. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, Appointments
of Outsiders to Japanese Boards, Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN. ECON.
225 (1994) (finding that the turnover of incumbent top executives increases substantially in Japan
in the years when outside bank and corporate directors are appointed to Boards and further
concluding that banks and corporate shareholders play an important monitoring and disciplinary
role in Japan); Maury, supra note 88, at 10.
92. Isabelle Dherment-Ferere, Jens F. Köke, & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Monitoring by
Blockholders in Europe: Empirical Evidence of Managerial Disciplining in Belgium, France,
Germany and the UK (Ctr. for Euro. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 01-24, 2001),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=358286 (discussing how there is some evidence in Belgium
and Germany of an increase in executive turnover when individuals or families (not related to a
director) holding companies or industrial firms are blockholders).
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of the U.S. and the U.K. Although these reforms almost uniformly reflect
the better governance practices relevant to “outsider” systems, these
developments, even if not perfectly responsive to the “inside” system
concerns evident in Italy’s business culture, have been a tremendous
improvement for the Italian capital markets. With its 2010 CONSOB
resolution, Italy has made positive strides in regulating the disclosure of
controlling shareholder related transactions and increasing the corporate
approval process with respect to these transactions. But more work still
needs to be done in order to maximize the monitoring role of these
shareholders, increase the transparency with respect to the inner workings
of controlling/dominant shareholders, and control the potential for private
benefit extraction.
Research has shown that management turnover in response to poor
performance decreases when the top management of Italian public
companies is not independent from the controlling family or shareholder.
There is a low sensitivity of turnover to performance when: (1) top
executive positions are held by the controlling shareholder; (2) control is
completely in the hands of one shareholder and no other dominant or large
shareholders are present; and (3) the controlling shareholder’s cash flow
rights are less than 50% of the firm’s total outstanding cash flow rights.93
This research suggests that, to realize the monitoring benefits of the
controlling shareholder and to strengthen the controlling shareholder’s
oversight role in connection with the problems of unrestrained management
risk-taking, we should consider reforms that encourage: (1) independence
between management and the controlling shareholder; (2) increased or
minimum cash flow ownership levels to be held by the controlling or
dominant shareholder; and (3) the development of the presence of other
shareholders with significant voting and cash flow rights in the company. In
addition, further research is necessary in order to understand how
controlling shareholders exert control over management and whether more
formal legal mechanisms to regulate such control are needed. Although
there is room for the continued improvement of its corporate governance,
the time has come for Italy to focus its reforms so as to capitalize on both
the unique advantages offered by the controlling or dominant shareholder
system and the improvements already made in protecting the investing
minority.
In striking the regulatory balance between, on the one hand, the need
for transparency, disclosure, and shareholder rights and, on the other, the
need to retain and capitalize on the monitoring benefit of the controlling
shareholder structure, the Italian capital markets may succeed in
encouraging the new listing of companies while increasing investor
93. Paolo F. Volpin, Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive
Turnover in Italy, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 61 (2002).
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confidence in the capital markets system. Although further reforms may be
required, it is time for Italy to stress that the differences of the Italian
business culture may also have value. Pricing-wise, a premium is paid for
voting versus non-voting shares. In countries, such as Italy, characterized
by companies with controlling shareholders, the price differential between
the voting and non-voting shares has been found to be one of the highest in
the world.94 In a controlling shareholder company, this price discrepancy
may reflect both the decreased power to control corporate decision-making
and the increased risk of expropriation of benefits by the controlling
shareholders. Purchasers of these non-voting shares can expect to pay
proportionately less for these limited voting rights shares. As regulatory
improvements are made to address the issue of controlling shareholder
expropriation, however, the pricing of these shares should improve; and, in
contrast to the high-flying risk-taking actions of U.S. management
(especially those of financial services industry leaders) in recent years, the
existence of an engaged, active controlling shareholder comes with the
benefit of closer monitoring of management decisions. The Italian capital
markets, therefore, may be offering investors a different investment choice:
securities with significant minority shareholder protections in companies
where the actions of management are closely scrutinized by another
interested party (the dominant shareholder), coupled with the opportunity
for financial gain but free of the responsibility of monitoring. This too has
value that should be reflected both in the price of the shares being
purchased and the reputation of the Italian securities market.
The Italian business culture may, in fact, present two opportunities. The
first is an alternative corporate governance approach that differentiates the
Italian capital markets from those of the U.S. The second is an opportunity
for those investors who recognize that: (1) managerial expropriation is as
much a risk to the value of minority shareholders as controlling shareholder
expropriation; (2) Italy has made great strides in affording minority
shareholders protections similar to those available in the U.S. and, with the
passage of the March 2010 CONSOB resolution, has made progress toward
regulating controlling shareholder expropriation; and (3) the existence of a
dominant shareholder can actually benefit the minority shareholder.
Although in Italy—as in the U.S. and elsewhere—the work of
improving capital markets must continue, it is important to recognize that
much progress has been made with respect to increasing the attractiveness
of Italian capital markets to investors. At this point, given the reforms over
the past twenty years and the increased recognition of the imperfections of
U.S. corporate governance, it is time to increase awareness in the

94. E.g., Dyck & Zingales, supra note 3, at 538; Nenova, supra note 3, at 327–28, 331–36,
340–41; Zingales, Value of the Voting Right, supra note 3, at 125–26.
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marketplace of the potential unique benefits arising from investing in
companies characterized by controlling shareholders.

